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1 July 2017. This has the potential to change the internal
dynamic of hospitals to enhance the focus on safety. 
The implications for hospitals of this change are also 
discussed.
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Abstract
One of the critical issues facing healthcare systems 
internationally is to improve safety of care. 
Unfortunately, safety discussions, both in hospitals and 
in policy documents, often quickly turn to identifying 
and acting on ‘preventable’ mishaps. But preventability 
is a slippery concept, which this paper discusses.
A contemporary policy response is to introduce financial 
incentives in hospitals and/or states to improve safety, 
proposed for national implementation in Australia from 
Healthcare systems face challenges across four domains: 
equitable access; safety and quality of care provision; 
financial and workforce sustainability; and adjusting to the 
previous three challenges over time. It would be a luxury to 
face only one problem to be solved at any one time, without 
having to worry about the constraints in the other domains. 
The essence of management is dealing with situations of 
conflict, be it interpersonal conflict, conflict of goals or 
priorities, or conflicts of constraints.
In this paper I will reflect on the problems being faced in one 
domain: quality and safety of care, and within that, focus on 
safety. I will also limit my consideration to hospital safety 
and particularly challenge the concept of ‘preventability’ of 
adverse events and discuss the role of pricing in addressing
hospital safety.
What is the current state?
The recent review of hospital quality in Victoria reported 
that in 2014-15, there were more than 600,000 additional 
diagnoses recorded for patients that occurred after they 
were admitted to hospital (see Table 1); about one in every 
eight patients had some form of complication during their 
stay.
Table 1: Incidence of all hospital-acquired diagnoses 
classified by CHADx major class, Victorian hospitals, 
2014–15
Major CHaDx Class  PubliC  Private  all
01: Post-procedural complications 34,106  17,808  51,914
02: Adverse drug events  14,858  6,402  21,260
03: Accidental injuries  6,078  2,179  8,257
04: Infections  12,846  2,694  15,540
05: Cardiovascular complications  47,304  17,984  65,288
06: Respiratory complications  23,499  8,737  32,236
07: Gastrointestinal complications 36,815  19,118  55,933
08: Skin conditions  18,196  7,509  25,705
09: Genitourinary complications  27,575  9,753  37,328
10: Hospital-acquired psychiatric states 16,959  5,934  22,893
11: Early pregnancy complications 2,710  757  3,467
12: Labour and delivery complications 76,050  20,600  96,650
13: Perinatal complications 40,458  4,424  44,882
14: Haematological complications 12,994  3,970  16,964
15: Metabolic complications  45,536  10,743  56,279
16: Nervous system complications 4,245  1,429  5,674
17: Other complications  40,535  17,563  58,098
total  460,764  157,604  618,368
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This rate is probably significantly higher than patients would 
expect.
These raw numbers tell an incomplete story. The language 
used in the previous paragraph was carefully chosen: it simply 
referred to additional diagnoses (now usually simplified to 
‘hospital acquired’ diagnoses) and complications. There is a 
plethora of terms used to indicate ‘a patient was injured’ or 
‘a mistake was made’ in the course of healthcare, a situation 
which has been described as ‘perplexing on a good day and 
near impossible on a bad one’. [2] A focus on mistakes can 
quickly be turned by the media into a hunt for people to 
blame. [3]
Describing the problem is only the first step toward solving 
it. While the table shows all hospital acquired diagnoses, 
it does not attempt to identify ‘preventability’ of any of 
the complications, nor grade those complications by their 
sequelae, which may be great (e.g. death) or small (treated 
and resolved with medication).
Preventability is not where to start
Adverse events are, by definition, adverse, unfortunate and 
harmful. Thus one is immediately (and appropriately) drawn 
to what might be done to reduce them. The next common 
leap is to attempt to identify those adverse events which 
could have been prevented, or defensively define most 
harm as ‘unpreventable’. This leap, to label as ‘preventable’ or 
otherwise, is flawed. A better approach is to look at all such 
events, and to identify where the rate in a particular hospital
differs from the system-wide average or the hospital’s own 
past trend.
The concept of ‘preventability’ in discussing safety in 
hospitals is fraught for seven main reasons.
The first is that different definitions of preventability abound 
with no consistency in terms of underlying logic, most 
being locally derived, and with weaknesses in almost all 
the definitions used. [4] Second is ‘the ‘eye of the beholder’ 
problem: that is, inter-rater reliability in assigning this 
status to specific cases. Typically studies cite very low rates 
of agreement between reviewers of medical notes [5-9] 
Experienced reviewers only slightly improve agreement. [10]
The third problem is a temporal one. What might be 
‘preventable’ changes over time and with advancing 
medical knowledge: what was not preventable yesterday 
(say, an adverse drug reaction) is preventable today because 
of better knowledge of patient factors predisposing to such 
a reaction. [11] With the new knowledge, the event becomes 
‘preventable’ where it wasn’t before. By ignoring those events 
currently not deemed to be ‘preventable’, opportunities for 
developing such new medical knowledge are lost.
Fourthly, ‘preventable’ is location or facility-specific Diag-
nostic technologies to identify underlying disease, for 
example, may not be accessible in every facility in order 
to make a timely clinical decision. Thus, such judgements 
entail an implicit imperative to prevent adverse outcomes, 
regardless of the economic or geographic logic of doing so. 
The ‘first do no harm’ ethic is an important one in medicine, 
but increasingly, patient safety interventions face the 
same expectations of cost-effectiveness as other clinical 
interventions. [12]
Fifthly, when ‘preventable’ is treated as a dichotomous (yes/
no) variable, opportunities may be lost to reduce rates of 
harmful clinical outcomes, even if such outcomes are not 
‘preventable’ in every patient. [13]
Sixthly, studies of adverse events regularly report the 
proportion that are ‘preventable’ and any ‘preventable’ 
outcomes (for example, ‘preventable mortality’). Describing 
an adverse event as preventable, however, might lead one to 
believe that, absent the adverse event, the patient’s outcome 
would have been different. [14] Adverse events often occur 
in very sick patients (15), and it may be impossible to 
determine the extent to which their prognosis was affected
by the adverse event. Few studies have attempted the 
difficult task of estimating the ‘conditional prognosis’- the 
prognosis without the adverse event – Hayward and Hofer 
[7] being an exception. 
The final and seventh problem with the concept of 
‘preventability’ is that it is very easy to slip from an untoward 
event being ‘preventable’ to a hunt for whose failure it was 
that it wasn’t prevented.
Contemporary best practice in safety is to understand the 
complex system factors involved in patient harm and to 
avoid blame. Learning from adverse events should be the 
goal of patient safety activities. [16-19]
Having fewer adverse events is certainly better than having 
more of them, but best practice is more about ensuring 
that future adverse events are avoided than identifying 
and pointing a finger at the individual who slipped up on 
a particular occasion. A good hospital is thus one which 
encourages reporting of incidents, [20] embraces the failure 
associated with adverse events, acknowledges what went 
wrong and puts in place systems or training to ensure that it 
is unlikely to happen again.
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‘Good’ is thus not simply having an adverse event rate below 
a particular threshold, but rather having a culture that 
accepts and learns from such events.
The place of pricing
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) recently (1 
April 2016) endorsed a new Heads of Agreement, which 
included the following commitments about pricing for 
quality and safety:
 While most healthcare in Australia is associated with 
good clinical outcomes, preventable adverse events 
or complications continue to occur across the health 
system. By reducing hospital acquired complications, 
there is potential to not only improve patient safety, 
but also achieve efficiencies. The Parties … will develop 
a comprehensive and risk adjusted model to integrate 
quality and safety into hospital pricing and funding.
 a.  The model will determine how funding and pricing  
  can be used to improve patient outcomes and reduce  
  the amount that should be paid for specified adverse  
  events, ineffective interventions, or procedures known  
  to be harmful.
 b.  This could include an adjustment to the amount the
  Commonwealth contributes to public hospitals for a  
  set of agreed hospital acquired conditions...
 The Parties agree to develop the model for implementation  
 by 1 July 2017. [21]
Although well-intentioned, the phrasing of this commitment 
is a complete muddle.
Sub-paragraph a, for example, states that the funding model 
has two distinct objectives to ‘determine how funding and 
pricing can be used to improve patient outcomes’ and how 
the model can ‘reduce the amount that should be paid for 
specified adverse events’. The latter objective is a legitimate 
and obvious one for a funding model. The former is not so 
clear. A funding system can certainly provide incentives to 
improve outcomes, but in and of itself, a funding model 
won’t improve outcomes at all.
In addition, sub-paragraph a is quite broad, referring to 
‘specified adverse events, ineffective interventions, or 
procedures known to be harmful’; these are narrowed 
down to ‘a set of agreed hospital acquired conditions’ in 
subparagraph b.
The logic for providing financial incentives on hospitals to 
reduce rates of adverse events is quite sound and many 
options exist for how this might be done [22-23] but 
pricing incentives may not be the place to start for reducing 
ineffective interventions, [24] or procedures known to be 
harmful.
One solution, one problem
Nobel laureate in economics, Jan Tinbergen, famously 
established that multiple economic problems require 
multiple economic instruments to solve them. [25] The 
same is true in health policy: rarely can one solution fix 
multiple problems. Unfortunately the rhetoric around the 
COAG meeting did not make clear why a pricing strategy 
was being pursued to reduce adverse events, especially 
when the Australian Commission of Safety and Quality in 
Healthcare published a very sceptical literature review on 
this topic in 2013. [26]
Hospitals (and their clinicians) are influenced by a range 
of incentives, not all of which are financial: reputation 
and intrinsic motivations are very important to quality 
improvement in the health sector. [27] The pricing incentives 
proposed by COAG are a signal that heads of government (or 
their advisers) think that more action needs to occur in safety 
and quality. This may be an altruistic motivation – pushing 
the safety and quality agenda may reduce safety failures 
and benefit patients – but it may equally be motivated by 
a desire to reduce spending, or perhaps both as the second 
sentence of the quoted paragraph suggests.
The implications for hospitals
It is tempting for hospital managers to deride any 
policy change as a poorly thought through unnecessary 
imposition, or, as a reader of this series of papers might infer, 
a solution to a problem which may not exist. So just what 
is the problem being solved with a potential new pricing 
regime?
Certainly no one can be complacent about the series of 
safety and quality scandals Australia has seen in recent years, 
so there is a real problem affecting real people. Introducing a 
safety and quality component into activity based funding is 
a logical next step. Governments and private health insurers 
are upping the ante on managers.
Changing the nature of the financial incentives on health 
service managers is part of signalling the importance of this 
issue. Managers cannot say that safety and quality issues are 
the sole preserve and responsibility of clinicians (if that ever 
were a reasonable position). Poor quality will directly impact 
on a hospital’s performance.
Poor quality care costs money, [28] and hospital acquired 
diagnoses add millions to the cost of the Australian 
healthcare system. [29-31] Introduction of financial 
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incentives sheets responsibility for these additional costs 
back to where they belong – at the local hospital.
From a clinician’s perspective, the introduction of a financial 
incentive for higher quality adds another basis for arguing 
for resources to improve quality of care. The new incentives 
mean that it is now in the financial interest of hospitals 
to improve their care, reinforcing other motivations, and 
making it feasible for clinicians to mount a ‘business case 
for quality’ [32] and for managers to garner the attention of 
their boards. [33]
The renewed focus on hospital safety and quality is to be 
welcomed, and not criticised as another imposition. Unlike 
other possible policy changes, introduction of a pricing 
incentive for safety is soundly based, and is not simply a case 
of a solution in search of a problem.
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